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GATS and Banking in the Pacific Basin
Over the past three decades, economies in the
Pacific Basin have grown rapidly by strengthen-
ing their links with other economies through
trade and foreign investment. However, rapid
economic growth and closer economic links with
other countries have led to increased demand for
a wide variety of banking and other financial
services, posing a dilemma for Pacific Basin
economies. On the one hand, these economies
would like to develop their domestic financial
markets to provide more efficient financial serv-
ices that can foster continued economic growth.
Since banks from industrial countries like the
u.s. have the resources and expertise to provide
needed financial services, there is an incentive
fo; Pacific Basin economies to liberalize and
open the financial markets to entry by foreign
banks. On the other hand, policymakers in these
economies are concerned that competition from
foreign banks will adversely affect the position of
domestic banks. This creates pressures to limit
the entry offoreign banks.
The adoption ofthe General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) at the Uruguay round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations, concluded in December
1993, raises hopes that Pacific Basin economies
will become more open to international banking.
However, the precise extent to which the finan-
cial services provisions of GATS will be applied
remains uncertain and is likely to involve nego-
tiations that will extend into 1995. This Weekly
Letter briefly discusses the principles of GATS
and the factors that may affect its implementation
in Pacific Basin banking markets.
GATS and financial services
The GATS agreement sets out a number of gen-
eral principles governing the treatment offoreign
banks; among the most important nondiscrimi-
nation and market access. To implement nondis-
crimination, countries would grant national treat-
ment to foreign banks, that is, they would treat
foreign banks in the same way they treat their do-
mestic banks. Countries would also grant most
favored nation status to foreign banks, meaning
that all foreign banks from countries subscribing
to GATS are to be treated equally (in terms of
regulations, access to domestic markets, and so
forth).
As national treatment and nondiscrimination may
not fully eliminate barriers to the entry of foreign
banks, GATS also identifies steps countries are to
take to enhance marketaccess. For the financial
services sector, these include: (i) listing monop-
oly rights in financial services and trying to elim-
inate them or to reduce their scope; (ii) allowing
foreign financial services suppliers the right to
establish or expand in their domestic financial
markets, including through the acquisition of ex-
isting enterprises; (iii) allowing foreign suppliers
of financial services to offer any new financial
services; (iv) trying to remove or to limit any
nondiscriminatory measures that adversely affect
the ability offoreign financial services suppliers
from operating, competing, or entering domestic
financial markets.
If fully implemented, GATS would significantly
enhance international banking in the Pacific
Basin. However, the precise extent of implemen-
tation depends on commitments by individual
countries, and it is expected that further negoti-
ations will be needed to bring most countries'
schedules in closer compliance with GATS prin-
ciples. In particular, it is unclear how much of
GATS will be adopted by Pacific Basin econo-
mies and how soon because it could entail signif-
icant changes for these economies. At present,
Asian Pacific Basin economies that are members
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), under whose auspices GATS was for-
mulated, include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
South Korea, Malaysia, the Pf,ilippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand.
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To shed light on the types of changes that might
be needed to achieve GATS objectives in the
banking sector, it is useful to examine two as-
pects of international banking in the region,
namely: (i) external borrowing by banks in Pa-
cific Basin economies, which provides business
opportunities for foreign banks, and (ii) the par-
ticipation of foreign banks in domestic banking
markets.
External borrowing
Reflecting robust and stable growth in the Asian
Pacific Basin, external bank borrowing has grown
much more rapidly in that region than in the rest
of the world. According to International Mone-
tary Fund statistics, the foreign liabilities of banks
in Asian countries-otherthan Japan-grewat an
annual rate of18 percent between 1983 and 1992,
compared to 9 percentfor developing countries as
a group, and 13 percent for industrial countries;
and in 1992, banks in Asia (excluding Japan) held
12.5 percent of the world's total foreign liabilities.
But to some Pacific Basin countries, unrestricted
external borrowing is not necessarily desirable,
and they impose controls designed to regulate
such borrowing. Two main reasons are typically
offered for such controls. First, governments may
want to limit external credit to avoid possible
debt repayment problems in the future while at
the same time directing such creditto preferred
sectors (for example, Indonesia, South Korea, and
the Philippines).
Second, governments at times restrict, or seek
to discourage, external horrowing in response to
surges in foreign capital inflows that threaten
macroeconomic policy objectives, such as a ex-
change rate target. Taiwan, which is not currently
a GATT member, provides a good illustration. In
1987, Taiwan froze the external liabilities of its
banks in response to a surge in capital inflows
that put upward pressure on the exchange rate
and threatened monetary control. Although re-
strictions on inflows were gradually liberalized,
they persisted in some form for years after the
episode. More recently, in January 1994, Malay-
sia, which is a GATT member, responded to
speculative capital inflows by limiting banks'
holdings offoreign funds that are not trade-related
or intended for investment in plant, equipment,
or stocks. It took measures that effectively raised
reserve requirements on foreign deposits, set a
ceiling on the net external liabilities of domes-
tic banks, and prohibited the sale of short-term
financial instruments to foreigners.
As Pacific Basin economies develop, it is likely
that external borrowing restrictions based on
concerns about debt repayment, or designed to
direct credit to preferred sectors, will decline, as
they have in the developed economies.
In contrast, restrictions on external borrowing
designed to curb large speculative capital flows
may persist, or may be imposed from time to
time. A vivid example of such speculation in de-
veloped countries is the attack on the European
exchange rate mechanism in the fall of 1992. In
particular, there may at times be a trade-off be-
tween the desire to maintain free international
financial and banking flows and the desire to
peg the exchange rate.
Foreign bank access
Foreign bank market shares vary widely in the
Pacific Basin. Foreign banks playa major role in
Hong Kong, and for historical reasons, they are
also important in the onshore banking markets of
Singapore and Malaysia, in spite of restrictions to
entry. In other markets, however, the participation
of foreign banks is more limited. Foreign banks
have recently accounted for 25 percent of total
bank assets in Malaysia, around 8 percent in In-
donesia and South Korea, and less than 3 percent
in Japan. By way of comparison, foreign banks
account for around 23 percent oftotal bank as-
sets in the U.S. However, foreign Qanks in the
Pacific Basin are similar in that they tend to spe-
cialize in certain areas, such as foreign exchange
transactions, international lending, or financial
innovation, and generally do not engage in tradi-
tional commercial banking, particularly at the
retail level.
The limited activities of foreign banks in most Pa-
cific Basin countries can be explained in part by
regulatory constraints. For example, a number of
countries believe that their banking markets are
adequately served by existing banks and choose
to restrict the issuance of more bank licenses.
While such restrictions may not single out foreign
banks, they effectively bar their entry. Foreign
banks have also faced restrictions on the number
of branches that they may open, the types of
business they may engage in, and in their ability
to take over domestic banks.
Restrictions on foreign bank access to domestic
markets appear to be motivated by concerns that
entry by well-capitalized, more efficient, and in-
novative foreign banks may lead to the failure of
weaker domestic banks. Such failures could havea destabilizing effect on domestic financial in-
stitutions and may result in the domination of the
banking system by foreign banks. These con-
cerns are particularly important in economies
with small and undeveloped financial systems
that have been sheltered from vigorous competi-
tion. To obtain some of the benefits of a foreign
banking presence while sheltering domestic
banks, restrictions are designed to limit, but not
completely prevent, foreign bank presence or
access to domestic financial markets. In some
cases, tax and regulatory incentives may encour-
age a foreign banking presence in an offshore
banking market, rather than in the local banking
market. Regulations insulate domestic banking
markets by limiting offshore business to foreign
currency transactions with nonresidents. Offshore
markets exist in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Taiwan and Thailand.
Competitive disadvantages
Apart from explicit regulatory barriers to entry by
foreign banks, three other factors have placed for-
eign banks at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to domestic banks, namely, controls on
financial transactions, institutional barriers to
entry, and high entry costs.
Controls on financial transactions. In some Pa-
cific Basin economies, controls on interest rates
limit the ability of foreign banks to compete on
the basis of price, a significant consideration if
foreign banks are more efficient than domestic
banks. Foreign bank entry also may be affected
by other controls, such as credit guidelines, that
require banks to allocate a certain proportion
of their loans to certain sectors, regardless of
profitability.
Institutional barriers~f\s new entrants, foreign
banks need to develop a strong domestic cus-
tomer base in order to compete effectively. How-
ever, institutional arrangements may make it very
difficult to developsuch relationships. For exam-
ple, a number of banking markets in the Pacific
Basin have regulated financial systems domi-
nated by state-owned banks or by a small num-
ber of banks that receive government support.
Such banks tend to attract most depositors and
borrowers. Even when banks are privately owned,
institutional arrangements that tend to link banks
with a well-defined group of customers (such as
keiretsu groupings in Japan) will tend to limit
opportunities for outsiders.
High entry costs. It is often costly to develop the
infrastructure (such as branching networks) that
could lead to a greater banking presence. One
way of reducing this cost is to acquire an existing
domestic bank, but merger restrictions sometimes
prevent this. Foreign banks also find itmore costly
to raise funds in some ofthe domestic markets of
the Pacific Basin than do local banks.
Starting in the 1980s, many Pacific Basin econ-
omies have adopted measures to liberalize their
financial sectors. In particular, interest rates have
been deregulated, credit targets have been lifted,
some banks have been privatized, and efforts
have been made to strengthen the capitalization
of domestic banks (by meeting Basle capital
standards) in order to improve their competi-
tiveness. These developments tend to enhance
the attractiveness of these markets for foreign
banks, and may therefore be seen as broadly
consistent with GATS objectives of improving
market access. However, institutional barriers
and high entry costs are likely to remain impor-
tant deterrents to entry, and GATS is not likely
to alter this.
Prospects
International banking plays an important role in
financial markets in the Pacific Basin. However,
regulatory constraints and other factors have
tended to limit entry and the scope of foreign
banking activity. Thus, there is some way to go
before the objectives of GATS will be fully
achieved in the region.
Concerns about speculative capital flows, the
stability of domestic banking markets, and the
foreign bank domination of domestic markets
will have to be dealt with before GATS principles
are fully adopted in Pacific Basin economies.
This process is likely to take time. Nevertheless,
increasing economic prosperity may help Pacific
Basin economies overcome these concerns and
recognize that competition with foreign banks is
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